The paper understands the rise of ethical codes and professional ethics from the point of view of their contribution to the formation of a democratic citizenship. Various aspects of professional ethics are analyzed from the perspective of an agent-based ethics for which goods, norms and virtues are complementary factors for intelligence and individual judgment development. Through a conception of democracy understood as a way of life, professional ethics acquire a renewed meaning as a central element for individual self-realization and social (...) emancipation. In short, under the label of democratic professionalism, and following Dewey’s moral and political philosophy, it is shown that professional ethics are more than a field of application, a constituent element of a civic ethic within the framework of a democratic society. (shrink)

Partiendo de los análisis de los epistemólogos de la virtud que sitúan la mentalidad abierta como virtud epistémica central el artículo muestra el indisoluble entrelazamiento entre sus dimensiones éticas y epistémicas. Se entiende la mentalidad abierta como virtud de acuerdo con una concepción falibilista de la experiencia y el conocimiento humano en el que se acentúa la capacidad de intervención del agente a través de sus disposiciones y hábitos. Finalmente, la argumentación conduce a una defensa ética del liberalismo político.

How can the evolution of the language in Ignatius of Loyola's writings between 1547 and his death in 1556 be explained? This article offers a new investigative path with the text itself as the point of departure; it challenges traditional theories based on the work of Juan A. de Polanco, Ignatius's secretary, and revisits the question of authorship in terms of Jesuit spirituality. To this end, it reviews several doctoral theses of recent years and utilizes the database Polanco and the (...) Ignatian Concordances. Leaving aside the content analysis used previously, it studies the hapax legomena of Ignatian writings at three levels. Thus, it results in an index of the paragraphs of the Constitutions in function of the newness of their vocabulary leading to several conclusions. The final section offers an example of using this new method of analysis for the concrete case of the word 'discretion.'. (shrink)

Tumours, and in general rapidly dividing cells, behave as dissipative devices that apparently waste glutamine, since its consumption seems to exceed both energetic and nitrogen needs. Although not conclusive, there is compelling evidence suggesting that the consumption of such large amounts of glutamine is essential to sustain high rates of cellular proliferation. Herein, I first review the experimental evidence linking proliferation with high rates of glutamine breakdown. Then, the current knowledge on the proteins and activities involved in this high glutamine (...) consumption will be summarized. Finally, the significance of the apparent waste of glutamine will be discussed on bioenergetic grounds. The discussion leads to the hypothesis that glutamine breakdown might energize some endergonic processes, as well as accelerating other exergonic processes related to cellular proliferation. BioEssays 26:778–785, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es definir la concepción del acto involuntario de Francisco Suárez y mostrarla como un medio que permite comprender y profundizar en su teoría de la acción humana. En esta cuestión, el Doctor Eximio parte de presupuestos elaborados por Tomás de Aquino que amplía y adapta siguiendo sus propias tesis metafísicas y teológicas sobre la relación entre Dios y las creaturas. Mostraremos cómo Suárez vincula el verdadero involuntario con el _simpliciter_, lo forzado, necesario e indeseado, dejando (...) al _secundum quid_ como un acto mixto en el que la libertad y la voluntad, pese a las injerencias externas, no quedan anuladas. Por último, subrayaremos las consecuencias de la definición suareciana de lo involuntario sobre la noción de libertad, haciendo patente que tanto una como otra serían imposibles fuera del marco teórico que él sustenta, caracterizado por la eficiencia humana (y su dependencia de la divinidad) y no por la premoción física. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Parenting and Moral Development provides a collection of state-of-the-art theories and research on the role that parents play in moral development. Contributors who are leaders in their fields take a comprehensive, yet nuanced approach to considering the complex links between parenting and moral development.

La erosión de la confianza en las capacidades epistémicas de la ciudadanía tiene en su raíz la radical separación entre hechos y valores que el pragmatismo ha considerado como clave de nuestra cultura. Hoy es posible superar el dualismo sobre la base de un conjunto de virtudes y disposiciones individuales que son tanto éticas como epistémicas. Este entrelazamiento entre lo ético y lo epistémico pone de manifiesto la imbricación entre una concepción deliberativa de la democracia con su exigencia de una (...) ética cívica y los requerimientos de una ética de la investigación científica en el marco de una sociedad democrática. (shrink)

Partiendo de los análisis de los epistemólogos de la virtud que sitúan la mentalidad abierta como virtud epistémica central el artículo muestra el indisoluble entrelazamiento entre sus dimensiones éticas y epistémicas. Se entiende la mentalidad abierta como virtud de acuerdo con una concepción falibilista de la experiencia y el conocimiento humano en el que se acentúa la capacidad de intervención del agente a través de sus disposiciones y hábitos. Finalmente, la argumentación conduce a una defensa ética del liberalismo político.

Moral Perfectionism: Ethical Theory from a Pragmatic Approach This article tries to rescue the perfectionist approach to moral theory from the pragmatic tradition and inspiration. Based on the philosophy of Dewey and taking into account authors like H. Putnam or S. Cavell, it tries to defend the idea that pragmatism allows us to understand moral perfectionism in a new way. In that way, perfectionism is bound to a certain interpretation of practical rationality, and a new understanding of moral objectivity and (...) human subjectivity. Finally, moral perfectionism is not a theory that aims to solve all moral dilemmas but provides an understanding of how to face up to the problems of ordinary moral life. (shrink)

Este trabajo interpreta el auge de los códigos éticos y de la ética profesional desde el punto de vista de su contribución a la formación de una ciudadanía democrática. Se analizan diversos aspectos de la ética profesional desde la perspectiva de una ética del agente para la que bienes, normas y virtudes resultan factores complementarios para el cultivo de la inteligencia y el juicio individual. A través de una concepción de la democracia que la vincula con los hábitos y modos (...) de vida, la ética profesional adquiere una renovada significación como elemento central para la autorrealización personal y la emancipación social. En definitiva, bajo el rótulo del profesionalismo democrático, y de la mano de la filosofía moral y política de Dewey, se muestra que la ética profesional es más que un campo de aplicación, un elemento constituyente de una ética cívica en el marco de una sociedad democrática. (shrink)

Insulin is stored within the pancreas in an inactive Zn2+‐bound hexameric form prior to release. Similarly, clinical insulins contain Zn2+ and form multimeric complexes. Upon release from the pancreas or upon injection, insulin only becomes active once Zn2+ disengages from the complex. In plasma and other extracellular fluids, the majority of Zn2+ is bound to human serum albumin (HSA), which plays a vital role in controlling insulin pharmacodynamics by enabling removal of Zn2+. The Zn2+‐binding properties of HSA are attenuated by (...) non‐esterified fatty acids (NEFAs) also transported by HSA. Elevated NEFA concentrations are associated with obesity and type 2 diabetes. Here we present the hypothesis that higher NEFA levels in obese and/or diabetic individuals may contribute to insulin resistance and affect therapeutic insulin dose‐response profiles, through modulation of HSA/Zn2+ dynamics. We envisage this novel concept to have important implications for personalized treatments and management of diabetes‐related conditions in the future. (shrink)

This new textbook is an exceptionally clear and concise introduction to the philosophy of action, suitable for students interested in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of social sciences. Moya begins by considering the problem of agency: how are we to understand the distinction between actions and happenings, between actions we perform and things that happen to us? Moya outlines and examines a range of philosophical responses to this problem. He also develops his own original view, treating the analysis (...) of meaningful action as the basis for understanding the distinctive interplay of agency, intention and commitment. Subsequent chapters examine recent attempts to integrate our understanding of action with the view of the world provided by the natural sciences. The work of Donald Davidson is examined in detail. Moya also discusses the views of many other authors who have contributed to recent debates in the philosophy of action, including Anscombe, Churchland, Harman, Hornsby, Goldman and O'Shaughnessy. (shrink)

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility. Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, _Moral Responsibility_ (...) lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root. Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility. (shrink)

According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding of (...) the concept of a robust alternative. I will leave aside whether PAP also holds for praiseworthy actions -/- Según el Principio de Posibilidades Alternativas, un agente es moralmente responsable de una acción sólo si hubiera podido actuar de otro modo. La noción de alternativa robusta desempeña un papel prominente en ataques recientes al PPA basados en los llamados casos Frankfurt. En este artículo defiendo el PPA para la culpabilidad moral frente a casos Frankfurt propuestos recientemente por Derk Pereboom y David Widerker. Mi defensa descansa en algunos principios intuitivamente plausibles que dan lugar a una comprensión nueva del concepto de alternativa robusta. No trataré la cuestión de la verdad del PPA para acciones moralmente laudables. (shrink)

This paper is a critical comment on an article of David Widerker which also appeared in the Journal of Philosophy. In this article, Wideker held, against positions previously defended by him, that in was possible to design effective counterexamples, in the line initiated by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, to the so-called “Principle of Alternative Possibilities”. The core of my criticism of Widerker is to deny that agents, in his putative counterexamples, are morally responsible for their decisions, owing to the fact (...) they are not able to respond appropriately to moral reasons. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which (...) they would arise out of a view of agents too strongly dependent on the will. /// Este trabajo se ocupa de la concepción del autoconocimiento en el libro de Richard Moran Authority and Estrangement. Tras presentar las líneas maestras de dicha concepción, sostengo que ésta, a pesar de su novedad e interés, podría adolecer de defectos importantes. Así, con respecto a las creencias formadas mediante la deliberación, la propuesta de Moran parece enfrentarse a problemas de circularidad o de regreso. Y parece también insatisfactoria acerca de creencias no formadas de ese modo. Finalmente, sugiero un diagnóstico de estos problemas, según el cual éstos surgirían de una concepción de los agentes excesivamente dependiente de la voluntad. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Spatializing Culture: The Ethnography of Space and Place by Setha LowCarlos J. L. BalsasSpatializing Culture: The Ethnography of Space and Placeby setha low London: Routledge, 2017Spatializing Culture: The Ethnography of Space and Place adds clarity to our understanding of the value of ethnographic scholarship in the study of socio-economic, cultural, and developmental transformations. The book is a thorough review of two established conceptual frames of analysis—the social production (...) of space and the social construction of space—coupled with an in-depth discussion of four newer ways to make sense of the world around us: embodied space, language and discourse, emotion and affect, and translocal space. As the world is transformed by a myriad of forces and events occurring simultaneously, its complexity intensifies insurmountably and we require clear and robust concepts, theories, methods, and tools to not only interpret it, but above all to attempt to change it in ways that are more beneficial to our collective co-existence while enabling the flourishing of those most at risk.Readers of Spatializing Culture will find plentiful theoretical constructs, lineages, diverse viewpoints, examples, and overall opportunities for reflecting on how the (built) environment, spaces, and places have been changing mostly due to our behavior. Inspired by Foucault’s take on genealogy, in chapter 2, Setha Low traces the history of space and place according to distinct interpretative schools of thought ranging from philosophical and mathematical, French social theory, geographical, architectural, environmental psychology, to anthropological, and even archeological. Five Venn diagrams are utilized to illustrate the main conceptual relationships between space and place. Most of the book’s in-depth case studies were researched by the author with only a small number investigated and written up by fellow scholars, which Low utilizes in the book with gratitude. The interrelated thematic and distinct geographical scope of the cases is one of the book’s hallmarks. The illustrative case studies come from such faraway places as Latin America (San José, Costa Rica), Asia (Taipei, Taiwan), North America (New York City; Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and San [End Page 151] Antonio, Texas), Southern Europe (Smederevska Palanka, Serbia), and the Middle East (Beirut, Lebanon; Cairo, Egypt; and Tel Aviv, Israel).Spatializing Culture was first mentioned to me years ago by a former colleague at the University at Albany, SUNY. His ongoing work in Latin America, coupled with his ethnographic training and prior work in a region of the world also extensively examined by Low in other scholarly works, was likely the reason for bringing it up in a conversation about the latest developments in the field and potential research opportunities. I acquired the book when I was teaching Global Urbanism and Culture and International Urban Planning. I was pleasantly surprised with the book’s thorough conceptual lineage, historic characterizations, attention to detail, comprehensive ethnographic investigations, and implications for transforming reality as well as institutional processes. Spatializing Culture is a welcome addition to urban planning textbooks, which tend to be relatively less critical, are often covered with normative constructs and statistics, and are more institutional in their characterization of problems and recommendations for further action.For the most part, the ethnographic method is qualitative, participa-tory, detailed, and quite comprehensive in characterizing key variables as the researcher found them on the ground. This differs slightly from urban planning’s preoccupation with public policy, policy analysis, rules and regulations, institutionalized procedures, the public good, and overall positivist and rationalist concerns with documenting reality and helping to lead transformative planning processes, whether in the realm of land use, transportation, housing, economic development, infrastructure, or the environment. Although International Urban Planning was to be taught in a rather orthodox manner with recourse to understanding planning cultures, best practices, lessons learned, and implications for similar situations, the Global Urbanism and Culture course was slightly more aligned with the discussions put forward by Low. These included attention to postmodern ideals, the use of creativity in community planning, distinctions between popular and highbrow culture, and the building of iconic structures in contexts of urban regeneration and mega-event planning. As such, my students were somewhat already exposed to issues of embodied spaces and to ideas of... (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to improve and give further support to a defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt cases which I put forward in some previous work. In the present paper I concentrate on a recent Frankfurt case, Pereboom's "Tax Evasion". After presenting the essentials of my defense of PAP and applying it to this case, I go on to consider several objections that have been (or might be) raised against it and argue (...) that they don't succeed. I conclude by pointing out that my criticism of Pereboom's example suggests a general strategy against other actual or possible Frankfurt cases. (shrink)

The connection between quantum physics and the mind has been debated for almost a hundred years. There are several proposals as to how quantum effects might be relevant to understanding consciousness, including von Neumann’s Consciousness Causes Collapse interpretation (CCC), Penrose’s Orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR), Atmanspacher quantum emergence theory, or Vitiello’s field theory. In this paper, we examine the CCC, in particular Stapp’s theory of interaction of mind and matter, and discuss how this imposes constraints to possible brain structures. We (...) then argue that those constraints may allow us to identify a possible locus of the interaction between mind and matter, if CCC is true. (shrink)

In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom are motivated by (...) a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es defender el Principio de posibilidades alternativas (ppa) frente a dos recientes supuestos contraejemplos a éste, inspirados en el que diseñó, hace ya cuarenta años, Harry Frankfurt. Las tres primeras secciones resumen el estado de la cuestión. A partir de la cuar..

The current environmental crisis can be approached, through many perspectives, as a civilizational crisis. Alternatives of human transcendence are identified in the Inca civilization to compensate for the malaise that characterizes the actual crisis. There is a multicultural dimension to the manifestations of Hoasca occurring in Amazonian countries. As employed by the Beneficent Spiritist Center União do Vegetal in a religious context, it can contribute to the reconstruction of buen vivir, which served as the principle of the civilizations that preceded (...) the colonization of the Americas by Europeans. Today, the State openly confronts the manifestation of the constitutional principles of buen vivir, religious freedom, and the protection of this cultural heritage. Here, the implications of the civilizational crisis and ways of overcoming it are approached from the standpoint of deep ecology, but the implications also reflect the doctrinal vision of the UDV to which the authors are affiliated. (shrink)

A group is in a state of pluralistic ignorance (PI) if, roughly speaking, every member of the group thinks that his or her belief or desire is different from the beliefs or desires of the other members of the group. PI has been invoked to explain many otherwise puzzling phenomena in social psychology. The main purpose of this article is to shed light on the nature of PI states – their structure, internal consistency and opacity – using the formal apparatus (...) of Dynamic Doxastic Logic, and also to study the sense in which such states are “fragile”, i.e. to identify plausible conditions under which a PI state cascades into a state of shared belief as the result of announcement. (shrink)

In his paper “What the externalist can know a priori”, Paul Boghossian rejects the compatibility between self-knowledge and content externalism by arguing that compatibilists are committed to the absurd view that a subject can know, by reasoning purely a priori, substantive truths about the world, such as that water exists. In this paper I try to show that Boghossian’s incompatibilist argument does not succeed. According to Boghossian, it is enough, for an externalist to reach the undesired conclusion, that she satisfies (...) a number of conditions that can be known by her a priori. I argue that, by an externalist’s lights, some of these conditions are simply too weak to be acceptable by her and some of them can only be known a posteriori. So, compatibilists are not committed to the absurdity Boghossian ascribes to them. (shrink)

The literature addressing bias and fairness in AI models (fair-AI) is growing at a fast pace, making it difficult for novel researchers and practitioners to have a bird’s-eye view picture of the field. In particular, many policy initiatives, standards, and best practices in fair-AI have been proposed for setting principles, procedures, and knowledge bases to guide and operationalize the management of bias and fairness. The first objective of this paper is to concisely survey the state-of-the-art of fair-AI methods and resources, (...) and the main policies on bias in AI, with the aim of providing such a bird’s-eye guidance for both researchers and practitioners. The second objective of the paper is to contribute to the policy advice and best practices state-of-the-art by leveraging from the results of the NoBIAS research project. We present and discuss a few relevant topics organized around the NoBIAS architecture, which is made up of a Legal Layer, focusing on the European Union context, and a Bias Management Layer, focusing on understanding, mitigating, and accounting for bias. (shrink)

Davidson’s famous 1963 paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” contains, in nuce, the main lines of Davidson’s philosophy of action and mind. It also contains the seeds of some major problems of Davidson’s thought in these fields. I shall defend, following Davidson, that rationalization or reasons explanation is a species of causal explanation, but I will be contending, against Davidson’s approach, that causality is best viewed, in this kind of explanation, as an integral aspect of justification itself, and not as an (...) independent, additional condition. (shrink)

In this paper I address the question whether self-knowledge is compatible with an externalist individuation of mental content. Against some approaches, I consider self-knowledge as a genuine cognitive achievement. Though it is neither incorrigible nor infallible, self-knowledge is direct, a priori (no based on empirical investigation), presumptively true and authoritative. The problem is whether self-knowledge, so understood, is compatible with externalism. My answer will be affirmative. I will defend this species of compatibilism against several objections, in particular those based on (...) the possibility of an individual’s being unwittingly switched between worlds. (shrink)

Tanto las teorías causales como las teorías no causales de la acción consideran la relación de justificación entre razones y acción como una relación no causal, de caracter puramente lógico o conceptual. Según las teodas causales, la acción intencional ha de satisfacer, independientemente de la condicion de justificación, una condición adicional de causalidad. En este artículo se sostiene, en cambio, que el concepto de justificación es ya causal, de modo que no es necesario exigir un requisito causal independiente para entender (...) el concepto de acción intencional. Esta concepción causal de la justificación y de la acción intencional no se ve expuesta al problema de las cadenas causales desviadas que afecta a las teorías causales ortodoxas ni a la amenaza deI epifenomenismo de las propiedades mentales. -/- Both causal and non-causal action theories take the justification relation to be a non-causal, purely conceptual or logical relation between reasons and action. According to causal theorists, intentional action has to satisfy, besides the justification condition, an additional and independent causal condition. In this paper it is held, however, that justification is already a causal concept, so that there is no need to resort to an independent causal requirement in order to understand the concept of intentional action. This causal view of justification and intentional action does not face either the problem of wayward causalchains which infects orthodox causal theories or the threat of epiphenomenalism of mental properties. (shrink)

Sila elección está causada por factores ajenos a la voluntad del agente, la libertad y la responsabilidad moral parecen perder su base. Pero si la elección carece de causas, se convierte en un acto irracional y, con ello, irresponsable. La salida de este dilema consiste en advertir la importancia de las razones morales en la deliberación práctica. De acuerdo con la tesis central del presente trabajo, la sensibilidad hacia las razones morales es una condición necesaria de la libertad y la (...) responsabilidad moral. La inconmensurabilidad de tales razones con las razones no morales concede a la elección el lugar central que demanda la responsabilidad moral, pero, al mismo tiempo, la mantiene vinculada a la racionalidad, evitando su conversión en un acto irresponsable. Si esto es así, la disminución (o pérdida) de la sensibilidad de un agente hacia las razones morales significa también la disminución (o pérdida) de su libertad y responsabilidad moral. (shrink)

In a recent article, Robert Lockie brings about a critical examination of three Frankfurtstyle cases designed by David Widerker and Derk Pereboom. His conclusion is that these cases do not refute either the Principle of Alternative Possibilities or some cognate leeway principle for moral responsibility. Though I take the conclusion to be true, I contend that Lockie's arguments do not succeed in showing it. I concentrate on Pereboom's Tax Evasion 2. After presenting Pereboom's example and analyzing its structure, I distinguish (...) two strategies of Lockie's to defend PAP against it, which I call "No True Alternative Decision" and "No Responsibility", respectively. According to NTAD, Pereboom's example fails because the agent has alternatives to his decision. I hold that this strategy is faulty because the alternatives that Lockie points to are arguably not robust enough to save PAP. According to NR, the example fails because the agent is not blameworthy for his decision. After defending the intuitiveness of the agent's blameworthiness, I present Lockie's arguments against this blameworthiness and suggest that they might beg the question against Frankfurt theorists. I examine Lockie's main response to this question-begging objection and hold that it does not clearly succeed in meeting it. Moreover, I hold that this response faces other important problems. Additional responses appear to be unsatisfactory as well. Hence, Lockie's defense of the agent's blamelessness lacks justification. The general conclusion is that Lockie does not succeed in defusing Pereboom's Tax Evasion 2 as a counterexample to PAP. (shrink)

In his 2000 paper, Hookway intends to argue that Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification does not have the sceptical consequences that Fumerton sees into it. We think Hookway is right in holding this. However, after commenting on his main considerations for this thesis, we shall develop an independent line of argument which reinforces the same conclusion.

En su artículo de 2000, Hookway pretende argumentar que el principio de justificación inferencial de Fumerton no tiene las consecuencias escépticas que Fumerton observa en él. Nosotros consideramos que Hookway está en lo cierto. Sin embargo, después de hacer algunos comentarios acerca de sus principales consideraciones a favor de esta tesis, desarrollamos una línea argumentativa independiente que refuerce esa misma conclusión.

En el presente trabajo sostenemos que la concepción de la intencionalidad en la teoría de la acción más ampliamente aceptada en la actualidad hace difícil una comprensión adecuada del papel de las emociones en la génesis e interpretación de la acción. La asimilación de las emociones a actitudes intencionales descuida lo que cabría llamar su contenido emocional y pasa por alto importantes diferencias entre su contenido intencional y el de las actitudes intencionales paradigmáticas, como creencias, deseos e intenciones. Sugerimos, sobre (...) esta base, que las relaciones externas y causales deberían tener un lugar más destacado en la comprensión y explicación de las acciones humanas. (shrink)